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Introduction 1
The structure of government -the allocation of authority across general purpose jurisdictions -¬ is a deep and puzzling phenomenon. Philosophers from Hobbes to Madison to Ostrom, and political scientists from
Riker and Elazar to Lijphart have sought to explain why some countries are, or should be, decentralized while others are centralized.
Since the creation of the United States, government structure has been conceived as a basic choice between a unitary and federal system. A unitary system is one in which decision making may be deconcentrated or even decentralized, but final authority rests with the center. A federal system, by contrast, disperses authority between "regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions" (Riker 1987: 101) . Most importantly, regions or their representatives can veto constitutional reform.
Each conception is rooted in a coherent, but opposing, philosophy:
"The contrast between Hobbes' formulation of the institutions of government and that formulated in the American experiments in constitutional choice suggests that fundamentally different approaches exist for the organization of governance in human societies. In the one, a single center of authority, the sovereign, is designed to dominate the whole. Each unit, as a sovereign state, is fully independent of other units as sovereign states. In the other, no single center of authority dominates the rest: all assignments
of authority are subject to limits" (Ostrom 1987: 22) .
The unitary/federal distinction lies at the heart of our understanding of constitutional choice, and has produced a rich literature on political institutions, but it has limited as well as structured our understanding of government. It conceives variation among governments as difference of kind, rather than degree (Wibbels 2005: 67) . It has directed attention to variation among federal regimes, but has much less to say about variation among unitary regimes, and while it is highly attuned to constitutional choice, it is less informative about incremental reform.
One result is a disconnect between sophisticated case studies of federal regimes and relatively crude attempts to estimate variation in government structure. Measures of government structure have struggled to impose continuous variation on a categorical distinction. One response has been to use fiscal data. However, as we explain below, the money a government raises or spends is a poor indicator of its authority.
In this article, we set out a measure of regional authority and apply this to intermediate government in 39 democracies. We revisit the structural determinants of government structure, paying special attention to the relative influence of the size and population of a country. The notion that countries with larger footprints tend to be more decentralized is grounded in the theory of spatial externalities which has provided a foundation for fiscal federalism. The alternative claim, that more populous countries tend to be more decentralized, results from the decrease in the cost of a public good as the number of contributors increases.
In the next section, we set out these expectations. We then estimate government structure in order to discriminate between them, paying detailed attention to the effects of alternative measurement instruments. We conclude that population is more potent than area in accounting for regional decentralization and that more refined measurement can be decisive in assessing competing claims about the structure of government.
Theorizing Government Structure

Spatial Theory
Three lines of argument have been used to connect the size of a country with its level of decentralization.
The first goes under the heading "spatial decay" which describes the increasing costs of communication imposed by distance. These costs could include "inefficiency in the provision and delivery of local public goods as well as transportation costs" (Arzaghi/Henderson 2005 : 1165 . If policy provision is subject to spatial decay, centralized provision of public goods becomes more wasteful the more distant the region, and correspondingly, decentralized provision becomes relatively more efficient.
The second argument applies the same spatial logic to policy externalities. The larger the footprint of a jurisdiction, the less its policy making will affect neighboring jurisdictions, and the smaller the efficiency loss arising from policy spillover. The argument informs public goods theory which sets up a trade-off between the benefit of adapting policy to particular regions and the loss arising from failure to internalize the effects of local decisions for neighboring regions (Alesina/Spolaore 2003; Oates 1972) . "Perfect mapping" of government structure requires that different government tiers provide efficient levels of outputs of public goods whose benefits are "encompassed by the geographical scope of their jurisdictions" (Oates 2005: 351; Olson 1969) . The implication is that the larger a country, the smaller the costs arising from policy spillover among regional governments (Oates 2005: 357) .
A third line of argument assumes that larger countries are more heterogeneous, and that as a consequence, larger countries decentralize in order to fit policy to the preferences of those living in particular regions (Alesina et al. 1995: 754; Breuss 2004: 40; Färber 2001: 112) .
Empirical research has confirmed the idea that larger countries are more decentralized. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005: 1179) conclude that " [L] and effects are enormous and significant, where greater land area and hence spatial dispersion increase the likelihood of being federal. From the base probability of 0.18 (…) a one-standard deviation in land raises the probability of being federal to 0.60." Panizza (1999: 113) finds that "When more than one measure of size is included in the regression, only Area shows a robust correlation with fiscal centralization." Garrett and Rodden (2003: 97) find that "As expected, countries with larger area are significantly more decentralized (…) Population and urbanization have no effect on decentralization in any of the estimations, so we drop them from subsequent analysis."
Soft Information Versus Scale Economies
An alternative to spatial theory conceives jurisdictional design as a trade-off between responding appropriately to soft information, which favors decentralization, and exploiting scale economies in providing the public good, which favors centralization. Both sides of the trade-off are influenced by the number of people in the jurisdiction.
The argument that soft information requires decentralization was put on the table by organizational economists and political scientists who conceive "decision-making for an organization as a process of repeated messages or dialogue" (Arrow 1991: 5; Kochen/Deutsch 1969: 735) . "We may regard it as close to an impossibility for individuals in close contact with the productive processes to transmit their information in all its details to another office. This proposition, long recognized in practice, is the basis of the management literature on the questions of centralization and decentralization" (Arrow 1961: 11) .
Arrow is taking issue with the Fordist notion that the job of front-line personnel is to convey information to their superiors who then make investment decisions. Decision making in firms engages persons as well as things, and such information may be soft -difficult to standardize, resistant to batching, and correspondingly expensive to pass up an organizational hierarchy. A local bank manager, for example, is better positioned to decide on a small-business loan by talking directly with the borrowers to assess their honesty and acumen than is a central banker who has access to a report written by the bank manager (Stein 2002: 1892f).
Government itself can be conceived as a process of repeated dialogue with citizens, and the information that is required for the provision of public goods is no less soft than that for small business loans. This mo- In this conception, the scale of government for public goods requiring "face-to-face delivery" is population sensitive. This is the case even if there is no heterogeneity of preferences across localities. The contexts of human interaction may vary even if preferences do not. "Street-level" case studies of policy implementation, beginning with the classic example of the Tennessee Valley Authority, generated a vocabulary to describe this -"task environment", "local interaction", "local stimuli" (Hodge 1938; Pritchett 1943; Scholz et al. 1991) .
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To the extent that information is soft, informational costs can be expected to increase with population. The larger a group, the more difficult it is to sustain meaningful dialogue: "[T]he need for a minimum message length to achieve any use leads to the view that the number of participants in the decision making dialogue must be strongly limited (…) The argument becomes even clearer if we take the cost of communication to be basically a delay in making the decision." (Arrow 1991: 6).
One scenario is where there are no economies of scale at all -i.e. a world of soft information where each message has to be individually handled (Treisman 2007: 63-69) . Minimizing the time delay in communication between a government and its population requires intermediaries who send and return messages to other agents and so on down to each person in the jurisdiction. The delay-minimizing set-up is a hierarchical network -a system of multi-level governance -where each agent communicates with the same number of agents. 4 Larger populations require more agents at more intermediate levels. evaluate with the data we have generated.
The benefits of decentralization exist in tension with its costs. These arise because the population of a decentralized jurisdiction may be too small to reap economies of scale. Decentralization becomes inefficient when the per capita cost of centralized provision of the public good is lower than the per capita cost of the good provided by each subnational jurisdiction. The fixed per capita cost of a public good is inversely related to the population of the jurisdiction that provides it.
Both the benefits and costs of decentralization can be expected to vary across a government's policy portfolio. The information necessary for efficient provision of defense or utilities, for example, is chiefly hard, whereas that for job retraining, kindergartens, or home care, involves soft information and on-the-job appraisal. Similarly, least-cost output in defense, transportation, utilities, and networks will usually require large amounts of capital, while that for school systems, hospitals, refuse disposal, welfare provision, and policing will require smaller amounts of capital (Ostrom/Ostrom 1971; Ostrom/Parks 1999).
The literatures on the provision of public goods produce plausible, but contrasting implications for government structure. Spatial theory implies that government structure is shaped by the territorial size of a country on the grounds that larger countries tend to be more heterogeneous, face greater spatial decay in the delivery of public goods, or suffer less from spillovers among subnational governments. An alternative view is that a country's population is decisive. If government structure is determined by a scissors whose blades are soft information and per capita cost, one would expect that, irrespective of their footprint or preference heterogeneity, countries with larger populations will be more decentralized.
Two inferential challenges lie in wait as we evaluate the validity of these claims. First, we need to estimate government structure in a reasonably unbiased way. Second, we must control for contending influences on government structure. We tackle these in turn.
Estimating Government Structure
In order to assess the claims set out above, we require a measurement instrument that a) comprehensively Operationalization of regional authority can draw on a well-established set of concepts. Authority is defined as legitimate power, i. e., power recognized as binding because it is derived from accepted principles of governance (Dahl 1968) . A regional government has some degree of authority, with respect to some territorial jurisdiction, over certain actions. The measure used here therefore specifies (A) the territory over which a government exercises authority; (B) the depth of that authority; and (C) the spheres of action over which it exercises authority.
With respect to territorial scope of authority (A), a government may exercise authority in its own jurisdiction or co-exercise authority over a larger jurisdiction in which it is part. This is the distinction between self rule and shared rule (Elazar 1987) which has wide currency in studies of federalism and regionalization (Amoretti/Bermeo 2004; Keating 1998; Lane/Ersson 1999; Watts 1998 Watts , 1999 Ziblatt 2006) . With respect to depth of authority (B), one needs to estimate the degree to which a government has an independent legislative, fiscal, and executive organization, the conditions under which it can act unilaterally, and its capacity to rule when opposed by the national government. With respect to spheres of action (C), a regional or international government can have authority over a smaller or broader range of policies. Authority over taxation and borrowing, and over constitutional reform are especially important.
These distinctions provide a frame for disaggregating regional authority in the dimensions set out in Table   1 and detailed in Appendix A and B. These dimensions hold together as a latent variable, which we use in the analysis below. Self Rule: The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region
Institutional depth
The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated.
0-3
Policy scope The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible.
0-4
Fiscal autonomy
The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population.
0-4
Representation The extent to which a region is endowed with an independent legislature and executive.
Shared Rule: The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole
Law making
The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation.
0-2
Executive control
The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings.
0-2
Fiscal control
The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues.
0-2
Constitutional reform
The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change.
0-3
Source: Hooghe, Marks, Schakel (2010). The Cronbach's alpha across the dimensions described above for 39 countries in 2006 is 0.93 which suggests that they can be interpreted as indicators of a single construct. 7 The principal components analysis in Table 2 reveals that the eight dimensions are closely associated with the domains of self rule and shared rule, but that 68 percent of the variance across the dimensions is shared. (1975, 1980, 1985) • Decentralization ratio (0-100). Calculated as 100 minus fiscal centralization ratio which is central government revenues as percentage of total public sector revenues (IMF data). Note: Countries listed are those for which we have Regional Authority scores and data for all independent variables in the Appendix. Table 3 summarizes alternative measurement instruments, and Table 4 lists the countries that each instrument has in common with the Regional Authority Index. The most cited measure is Lijphart's "Federal/
Unitary dimension" which he uses to test hypotheses about consensual versus Westminster democracy.
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The measure has three intermediate categories that contain ten of the 36 country-year observations (Lijphart 1999: 186-95) . Figure 1 matches observations in the Lijphart and Regional Authority Index for 1995 and Table 5 lists cases where Regional Authority Index scores diverge more than two standard deviations from those of alternative measures.
Figure 1: Lijphart and Regional Authority Estimates
Note: Estimates (z-scores) for 24 countries common to the Lijphart dataset and Regional Authority Index in 1995. 
Explaining Government Structure
We measure area and population of a country on a logarithmic scale because the expected effect of an additional person or square kilometers declines as absolute population or territory increases. In order to estimate their causal effects we exert the following controls (see Appendix A for details).
Ethnicity. Subnational communities -bounded groups of densely interacting humans sharing distinctive norms -are considered a magnet for regional authority. Ethnic communities often have distinct policy preferences. Rokkan and Urwin (1983) suggest that culturally peripheral communities are predisposed to resist centralization and demand self-rule (Gellner 1983). Additionally, government is hypothesized to work best when it encompasses communities that "can draw on a reservoir of common cultural materials -language, experience, understandings about modes of interactions -that makes it easier for community members to communicate and work together" (Deutsch 1966; Habyarimana et al. 2007: 711) .
Inequality. One expectation is that relatively rich regions will demand greater fiscal autonomy and poor regions will demand centralized redistribution (Bolton/Roland 1997; Dahl Fitjar 2008; Van Houten 2003) .
Alternatively, poor regions may prefer decentralization if their optimal fiscal policy differs substantially from that of the country as a whole (Alesina/Spolaore 2003: 63-67) . Beramendi (2010) argues that poor regions with distinctive labor markets may want decentralization to implement appropriate labor market policies. The available data do not allow us to model the interaction of regional inequality with regional fiscal or labor market variables over time, but we are able to observe the standard deviation of mean per capita income across regions in 39 countries.
Affluence. Laitin (1998) argues that citizens in richer countries may be willing to pay the costs of regional government to preserve cultural and linguistic diversity. Also, the policy portfolios of governments in richer countries may include a larger share of public goods that are efficiently delivered at the regional level 
Results
The first column of Table 6 models Population and Area under controls. Whereas Area does not reach significance, Population has a large and significant effect on Regional Authority. Subsequent columns impose robustness tests. The second column reports a measure of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF). Multicollinearity inflates the standard errors, making it harder to assess the independent effect of a variable. 9 A VIF < 3 is regarded as low, but it is still the case that because Area is associated with Population (R=0.69) and Inequality (R=0.24), its standard error is larger than it would be if it were uncorrelated with these variables. The inflation of the standard error for Area is √1.98= 1.41 which produces a VIF-adjusted standard error of 1.22⁄1.41= 0.87 . If Area were to share none of its variance with the other independent variables, the estimate for its effect on Regional Authority still fails to reach significance (t-value = 1.43).
The VIF-adjusted t-value for Population is 4.18.
8 Granger tests indicate that the causality runs from regionalist political party representation to regional authority. However, this cannot be generalized to party systems, for as Chhibber and Kollman (2004: 79) observe, "party systems become more national as governments centralize authority."
9 The VIF for independent variable j is 1/(1 − Rj2), where Rj2 is the squared multiple correlation from a regression of variable j on all other independent variables in the model. The VIFj is proportional to the variance of variable j explained by the other independent variables in the model. On VIF see O'Brien (2007). The final columns of Table 6 estimate a lagged endogenous variable model and a jackknife test. Both tests indicate that Population is significant in explaining Regional Authority and that Area fails to reach significance. Controlling for past levels of Regional Authority minimizes concern that the association between Population and Regional Authority is spurious. The estimates for Population and Area are robust when we delete individual countries from the analysis. 10 The analysis also confirms the significance of regional parties, democracy, ethnicity, and affluence. All trail population except for regional parties, but population comes out ahead when comparing VIF-adjusted t-values.
10 The strong and significant effect of population is robust when we control for urbanization. To the extent that it is easier to coordinate public goods provision in densely populated areas, urbanization should reduce the effect of population on regional decentralization (Arzaghi/Henderson 2005). We test both the independent effect of urbanization and its interaction with population, but detect no significant effects (results obtainable from the authors). Figure 3 estimates the effect of population on regional authority using Clarify. Uncertainty associated with the expected values of Regional Authority is greatest at the extremes. A country with a population of five million has an expected Regional Authority Index between 7.1 and 9.7 within a 95 percent confidence band, with an average 8.4 as our best guess. This would, for example, be a country in which regional governments have indirectly elected assemblies that appoint regional executives with the power to set the rate of minor taxes and exercise competences, subject to central veto, in economic and welfare policy. A country with a population of 50 million has a mean expected Regional Authority Index of 14.1 (within a 95 percent confidence band of 9.8 to 18.2). Regional governments in this country might then have elected assemblies, broader policy competencies not subject to central veto, power to set the base as well as the rate of minor taxes, and some role in national decision making, for example, by designating representatives to a second legislative chamber or by meeting routinely with the central government. and prefects continue to double as central state agents in urban planning and sanitation. New Zealand, which also has the minimum score in the left-hand figure, has 16 regions run by directly elected councils that can set the base and rate of property taxes and which are responsible for public transport, environmental policy, including air, land and marine pollution, as well as river and coastal management. Measurement can be decisive in assessing causality. This is revealed in Table 7 which compares results for common samples using different estimates of the dependent variable. The first column runs the model for all observations in Lijphart's dataset. The second column replaces Lijphart's measure with the Regional Authority Index for the same set of cases. As one would suspect from Figure 4 , Population is insignificant as a predictor using Lijphart's measure and significant when using the Regional Authority Index. Subsequent columns pair alternative instruments with the Regional Authority Index. Estimates for Population are insignificant while those for Area are significant for both the Arzaghi-Henderson measure and for the Regional Authority Index. The result appears to be driven by the sample which is limited to 16
countries with a population greater than 10 million. These include Australia, Canada, and the United States which are vast and decentralized. The regression line connects these countries and the remaining ones.
There is no association between Area and Regional Authority for the three English-speaking countries, and the association for the remaining 13 countries is weakly negative.
Brancati selects countries to maximize variation on ethnic groups. This works well for her purpose, which is to evaluate the effect of decentralization on ethnic conflict (Brancati 2006 (Brancati , 2008 , but produces estimates that are sensitive to outlying cases in the sample shared with the Regional Authority Index. A panel jackknife dropping individual countries produces insignificant estimates for all independent variables.
Fiscal federalism measures, including those used by Panizza (1999) and Stegarescu (2005) , confirm Area and disconfirm Population (final columns of Table 7 ). When we use the Regional Authority Index for the same set of cases, we find precisely the reverse. A possible explanation is that the allocation of taxation across levels of government is peculiarly sensitive to territorial spillover on the ground that a local tax will be suboptimal if non-residents living in a neighboring town use city services for which they are not taxed (Blöchliger/King 2006).
The evidence presented here asks us to think again about the spatial hypothesis for the structure of subnational government. While the arguments set out above linking area to government structure are plausible, their causal power is debatable. The first, spatial decay, explains decentralization as a cost of communication which is held to depend on distance. However, the reduction of communication costs since 1950 has not had the anticipated effect of increasing political centralization. 11 Moreover, larger countries are not much more heterogeneous than small countries. The much-cited analyses of Panizza (1999) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003) are based on models in which distance from the center (or capital) of a country is a proxy for preference heterogeneity. However, the association between country size and the Fearon (2003) measure of ethnic diversity across 39 democracies and quasi-democracies is just 0.078 (sig = 0.62). It is true that vast former colonies became home to diverse groups of immigrants, but these countries have high rates of geographical mobility, and as a result, they have few territorial minorities. By contrast, many
European countries, despite their small area, contain territorial minorities with distinctive languages and cultures.
Conclusion
In recent years there has been renewed concern with the effect of measurement error on valid infer- This article has argued that this is precisely the case in the study of government. The contrast between unitary and federal government is fundamental, yet it appears to have straight-jacketed efforts to estimate variation across time and space. It directs our attention to the rare event of constitutional choice, but away from reforms that do not shift a country from one category to the other. By conceiving government structure in dichotomous terms, the unitary/federal distinction is insensitive to change and overly sensitive to the creation of federal regimes in former British colonies.
Researchers who wish to measure government structure have added intermediate categories or they have used fiscal data on the share of subnational tax receipts or spending as an indicator of subnational authority. This is error-prone because a government's fiscal envelope can be a poor guide to its capacity to decide how it spends.
The measurement instrument used here is grounded on the distinction between self rule and shared rule made by federalism scholars themselves. We estimate self rule and shared rule along eight dimensions designed to tap the institutional depth of regional governments, the scope of their policy competencies, their role in law making, their executive capacity, representation, fiscal control, and constitutional powers. The instrument is sensitive to variation among federal regimes and among unitary regimes as well as between them, and we find that the population of a country is more consequential for government structure than its area. We also confirm the anticipated effects of cultural heterogeneity, democracy, and affluence on decentralization.
The population finding is consistent with the argument that government is shaped by a tension between centralization, which reduces the per capita cost of a public good, and decentralization, which facilitates dialogue between government and citizens (Arrow 1961; Deutsch 1966; Kochen/Deutsch 1969; Treisman 2007: 55-69) .
The area hypothesis is consistent with the fact that federal countries, which include the United States, Australia, and Canada, are on average much larger than unitary countries. However, the association between area and government structure disappears when we estimate variation in decentralization among non-federal countries. Finland, France, Japan, Spain, and Sweden, for example, are similarly sized, but have contrasting levels of decentralization. Because it diminishes variation within each category, the unitary/ federalism distinction is overly sensitive to the creation of federal regimes in the large spaces that were once British colonies and insensitive to variation at the other end of the scale.
Why should one care that the population of a country rather than its area is consequential for its government? A country's footprint is an inert object fixed for decades or even centuries, but its population is alive and changeable. The causal mechanism by which area affects government structure, spillover, depends on distance. The causal mechanism by which population affects government structure, soft information, depends on the benefit of dialogue in producing public policy. While we know less about soft information than we know about distance, the line of theorizing pursued in this article may draw on -and perhaps contribute to -theories of democracy and participation.
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The finding concerning the effect of population raises fundamental questions about how we should explain the structure of government. The size of a country's population is a structural factor that lies far back, and perhaps at the very beginning, in the causal chain leading to political decisions about the creation of a new level of government or the allocation of authority across existing levels. There is much to learn about the mechanisms. How does the functional pressure of population and the demand for soft information get translated into the political pressures that shape decision making? Attempts to answer this question will need to connect theories of party competition and public policy with accurate estimation of government structure. By carefully bringing more information to bear on the dependent variable, our purpose is to produce more valid estimates of causal effects, and ultimately better theory.
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Appendix A 
Regional parties
Proportion of seats in the national parliament for regional parties on an annual basis. Non-election years take on the value of the most recent election year prior. A party is regional when it has an exclusively regional electoral base. Source: Party list provided by Arjan H. Schakel and updated by the authors. 
4:
region meets the criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration or citizenship.
3) Fiscal Autonomy
Fiscal autonomy is evaluated in terms of a regional government's authority to set the base and rate of minor and major taxes in its jurisdiction (OECD 1999; Rodden 2004; Schakel 2008) . A schema developed by the OECD (1999), which distinguishes two notions of authority (control independent from central government, and shared rule with central government), and three areas of control (base, rate, revenue split), is drawn on to develop a simplified schema that produces (a) an annual (not decennial) measure, (b) for particular levels of government (not aggregated across subnational levels) that (c) is conceptually close to the thing to be measured: i.e., authority on fiscal matters. We assess a regional government's tax portfolio as a whole by distinguishing between major and minor taxes and within these, between the capacity to control base and rate, or rate only.
Fiscal Autonomy
0:
the central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes; 1: the regional government sets the rate of minor taxes;
2:
the regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes;
3:
the regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, corporate, value added, sales tax;
4:
the regional government sets the base and rate of at least one major tax.
4) Representation
Regional authority with respect to representation is conceived as the capacity of regional actors to select regional office holders: in the case of legislators, by indirect election by subnational office holders or by direct election in the region; in the case of an executive, by a mixed system of a regional/central dual executive or a regional assembly.
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Assembly 0: the region has no regional assembly;
1:
the region has an indirectly elected regional assembly;
2:
the region has a directly elected assembly.
Executive
0:
the regional executive is appointed by central government;
1:
dual executive appointed by central government and the regional assembly;
2:
the executive is appointed by a regional assembly or is directly elected.
B) SHARED RULE
The index distinguishes four avenues for regional participation in national decision making. A region may participate in making national law through its representation in the national legislature, usually in the upper chamber. A regional government may share executive responsibility with the national government for implementing policy. A region may co-determine the distribution of tax revenues in the country as a whole.
Finally, and most importantly, a regional government may exercise authority over the constitutional set up in the country or, in the case of a special autonomous region, over its own constitutional relationship with the center.
1) Law Making
Law making assesses a) the role of regions in structuring representation at the national level (i.e. in the second legislative chamber); b) whether regional governments are directly represented in the second chamber; c) whether regions have majority or minority representation there; and d) the legislative scope of the second chamber.
Law Making
0.5 for each of the following characteristics:
regions are the unit of representation in the legislature, i.e. the distribution of representation determined by regional weights, • rather than 'one citizen, one vote' in the country as a whole; regional governments designate representatives in the legislature; • regions at a given level have majority representation in the legislature; • a legislature with regional representation has extensive legislative authority, i.e. can veto ordinary legislation or can be over-• ridden only by a supermajority in the other chamber
2) Executive Control
Executive control taps the possibility that regional executives have routine meetings with the central government and whether these are advisory or have veto power (Wright 1988) . To score positively on this scale, such meetings must be routinized, not ad hoc, and to score the maximum, such meetings must be authoritative -they must reach decisions that formally bind the participants.
Executive Control
0:
no routine meetings between central government and regional governments to negotiate policy;
1:
routine meetings between central government and regional governments without legally bind ing authority;
2:
routine meetings between central government and regional governments with authority to reach legally binding decisions.
3) Fiscal Control
This refers to the role of regions in negotiating or, at the extreme, exerting a veto, over the territorial distribution of national tax revenues. Shared rule on taxation is a special case of legislative or executive shared
rule. Yet fiscal extraction and allocation are consequential enough to be considered separately. Regional governments may influence the distribution of national tax revenues, including intergovernmental grants, directly in the context of intergovernmental meetings, or indirectly via representatives in a legislature with regional governmental representation. 
4) Constitutional Reform
Constitutional reform assesses authority over the rules of the game (Amoretti 2004; Bednar 2009; Watts 1998) . The schema distinguishes between regional actors (i.e. electorates or regionally elected representatives) and regional governments. Since the purpose of the measure is to assess the extent of regional government authority, the role of the latter is given more weight than that of the former. So the questions asked are whether the central government or a unitary national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution; do they need the assent of regional electorates or their representatives; or must reform gain the cooperation or assent of regional governments?
Beyond Federalism | 37
Constitutional Reform
0:
the central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution;
1:
a legislature on the principle of regional representation must approve constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on equal regional representation (i.e. approval in a majority of regions);
2:
regional governments are a directly represented majority in a legislature which can do one or more of the following:
-postpone constitutional reform -introduce amendments -raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber -require a second vote in the other chamber -require a popular referendum 3: a majority of regional governments can veto constitutional change.
Regional Tiers
Country scores are obtained by aggregating scores for each regional tier in a country.
The first two columns of the table below model the Regional Authority Index with the Number of Tiers included as a control. Despite the strong association between Population and Number of Tiers (r = 0.67),
Population retains significance, and is the most significant variable when its high VIF is taken into account.
The third column treats the number of tiers as the dependent variable and shows that Population and
Regional Parties are significantly associated with the number of tiers under controls. Note: Non-standardized beta coefficients, robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe -Encouraging Academic Exchange and Intensive Research
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a new funding programme launched by the German Research Foundation in 2008. It is a centrepiece of the KFG to provide a scientifically stimulating environment in which innovative research topics can be dealt with by discourse and debate within a small group of senior and junior researchers.
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe" brings together research on European affairs in the Berlin-Brandenburg region and institutionalizes the cooperation with other universities and research institutions. It examines the role of the EU as promoter and recipient of ideas, analyzing the mechanisms and effects of internal and external diffusion processes in three research areas:
• Identity and the Public Sphere • Compliance, Conditionality and Beyond • Comparative Regionalism and Europe's External Relations
